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ABSTRACT
The roads of social welfare and commercial enterprise have come to an 
intersection in recent years.  Laws governing corporations are expanding to make 
room for new forms of business entities that seek to satisfy both social and 
financial goals.  The two most prominent “hybrid” business forms are the Low-
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Profit Limited Liability Company and the Benefit Corporation.  The newest hybrid 
entity to take effect is the Flexible Purpose Corporation, which was introduced in 
California at the beginning of 2012.  With the existence of hybrid organizations 
that already fit into the mold of Corporations and Limited Liability Companies, is 
there really a need for this new Flexible Purpose Corporation entity?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, a social entrepreneur in California sought to install solar panels at a 
local school.1 Unfortunately, the businessman could not afford the venture 
himself, nor appropriately solicit sufficient funding.2 He sought the help of a 
skilled lawyer to discover a manner in which to take on the project.3 Jenny 
Kassan, an attorney who specialized in “sustainable economies,” developed such a 
solution.4 Kassan’s idea created a club for donors to the solar panel project.5 To 
attract donors, the club would provide discounts and other benefits for its members 
to local green businesses.6 Kassan’s idea, in effect, created a social enterprise. 7  
The underlying theory of social entrepreneurship is to identify social problems and 
form creative solutions.  Some states have recently caught on to the concept of 
social enterprise, and are making an effort to assist entrepreneurs who are a part of 
the development.
This Comment will explore social enterprise and legislation backing the 
concept of social entrepreneurship.  Specifically, it will unpack a new hybrid entity 
concept, the Flexible Purpose Corporation.  Part II will present the difficulties 
traditional corporate sectors have experienced in satisfying social needs while 
remaining sustainable.  It will then explain the steps that have been taken to 
overcome the obstacles.  It will also examine different types of hybrid 
organizations which have been proposed and passed in several states.  Part III will 
introduce a new type of hybrid entity in California: the proposed Flexible Purpose 
Corporation (FPC).  Part IV will compare the FPC with existing hybrid entities.  It 
will present arguments for the advantageous and disadvantageous components of 
each form.  Part V will anticipate the impact this new legislation may have on 
California, and other states, if it is adopted.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A.  The Nonprofit and For-Profit Sectors
Nonprofit and for-profit entities are on opposite ends of the spectrum.  
                                                          







7 The term “social enterprise” will coincide with the term “social entrepreneurship” throughout this 
Comment.
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Nonprofit entities are required to promote public purposes and are forbidden from 
distributing profits to private owners.8 In contrast, for-profit entities are required 
to maximize the profits of their owners, and have no duty to those with no interest 
in the business.9 In the modern era, neither the nonprofit nor the for-profit sector 
has dominated the “market” of public service in the United States.10
Nonprofits have a fiscal incentive to provide for social welfare through the 
benefit of tax exemption.11 In order to gain exemption from federal taxes, a 
nonprofit organization “must be organized and operated exclusively for exempt 
purposes set forth in [Internal Revenue Code] section 501(c)(3), and none of its 
earnings may inure to any private shareholder or individual.”12 There are 
exceptions as to which activities of a nonprofit may be exempt.13
The central exception arises from unrelated business taxable income 
(UBTI).14 Under the UBTI concept, income of a nonprofit is subject to an income 
tax if profit is gained from a regularly carried on trade or business that is “not 
substantially related to the nonprofit’s performance of its exempt function.”15  
Thus, it is important that nonprofit organizations strictly adhere to their mission.  
Despite the tax benefit, and because of the limits created by UBTI, nonprofits are 
limited in their ability to raise capital.16  As a result, they are hindered in becoming 
fully sustainable.17 In order to attract capital from private parties, many exempt 
                                                          
8 Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and Ethics of Non-
For-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1377 (2003).
9 Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially 
Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 765 (2009).
10 See WALTER W. POWELL & RICHARD STEINWELL, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK 151–52 (2d ed. 2006) (“In many markets, nonprofit providers of service function alongside 
for-profit and/or government providers.”).  The authors go on to give statistics on the presence of each 
sector in several industries.  Id. at 152.
11 Horwitz, supra note 8, at 1382; Robert R. Keatinge, LLCs and Nonprofit Organizations: For-
Profits, Nonprofits, and Hybrids, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2009).  
12 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2010); Exemption Requirements—Section 501(c)(3) Organizations,
IRS, http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=96099,00.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2012) 
[hereinafter Exemption Requirements].  The exempt purposes are: “charitable, religious, educational, 
scientific, literary, testing for public safety, fostering national or international amateur sports 
competition, and preventing cruelty to children or animals.”  Exempt Purposes—Internal Revenue Code 
Section 501(c)(3), IRS, http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=175418,00.html (last 
updated Jan. 10, 2012).
13 Keatinge, supra note 11, at 566.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 560.  The elements for UBTI are: “(1) . . . income from a trade or business; (2) such trade 
or business is regularly carried on by the organization; and (3) the conduct of such trade or business is 
not substantially related to the organization’s performance of its exempt function.”  Id. For a discussion 
on exempt organizations and unrelated business taxable income, see id. at 560–62. 
16 See Michael D. Gottesman, Comment, From Cobblestones to Pavement: The Legal Road 
Forward for the Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 345, 347–48
(2007).
17 See M. Gregg Bloche, Health Policy Below the Waterline: Medical Care and the Charitable 
Exemption, 80 MINN. L. REV. 299, 321 (1995) (“Nonprofit organizations are not able to distribute 
profits to contributors of capital, diminishing their ability to raise capital.”); Gottesman, supra note 16, 
at 347–48; Michelle Scholastica Paul, Bridging the Gap to the Microfinance Promise: A Proposal for a 
Tax-Exempt Microfinance Hybrid Entity, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1383, 1395 (2010).
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organizations are eligible to provide tax deductions for donors.18
On the other hand, for-profit entities generally have the potential to access 
unlimited capital.19 However, their role in achieving social goals is hindered, in 
essence, because of the fiduciary duty that corporate directors have toward their 
shareholders.20 Thus, when faced with a decision between an action that benefits 
the public or increases shareholder wealth, for-profits must choose the latter or risk 
legal action by the shareholders.21  Another factor that contributes to the deficiency 
of for-profits promoting social welfare is the lack of a customary method to display 
their commitment to public good and accountability.22 While the inadequacy of 
nonprofits results from tax implications, for-profits can only be as charitable as 
their shareholders allow.23 In addition, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) places 
a limitation on the amount of deductions a for-profit corporation can claim at ten 
percent of its taxable income.24
B.  Corporations and LLCs
Corporations25 and partnerships26 preceded Limited Liability Companies 
(LLCs) as business entities.27 There was a gap between the original corporation 
and partnership entities, which some have called the “tax shield conundrum.”28  
This dilemma refers to the impossibility of having the “tax status of a partnership 
and the liability shield of a corporation”; a feat that was unachievable before the 
creation of the LLC.29 Owners of a partnership are wholly liable for all debts of 
the entity.30 On a positive note, the partnership is not taxable and tax liability 
                                                          
18 Exemption Requirements, supra note 12.
19 Gottesman, supra note 16, at 346 (explaining that Google.org’s for-profit status allows it to raise 
equity capital).
20 Alissa Mickels, Note, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling the Ideals of a For-
Benefit Corporation with the Director Fiduciary Duties in the U.S. and Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 271, 282 (2009).
21 Id.
22 Gottesman, supra note 16, at 351.
23 ALLEN R. BROMBERGER, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: A LAWYER’S PERSPECTIVE 2 (2008), available at
http://www.perlmanandperlman.com/publications/articles/2008/socialenterprise.pdf.
24 I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(A) (West 2010).
25 At the heart of corporate structure are “a board of directors that oversees the management of 
the corporation, and shareholder decisions decided by majority rule.”  Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty 
Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 384 (2004).
26 According to the Uniform Partnership Act, “[a] partnership is an association of two or more 
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”  UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6(1) (1914).  A formal 
written document is not needed for formation of a partnership, where one is required in other entity 
forms.  Joseph S. Naylor, Note, Is the Limited Liability Partnership Now the Entity of Choice for 
Delaware Law Firms?, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 145, 147 (1999).  This type of entity is typically best for 
very closely-held enterprises.  Larry E. Ribstein, LLCs: Is the Future Here?, 13 BUS. L. TODAY 11, 11
(2003).  “[T]he owners equally share control, profits, losses and partnership property.”  Id.
27 See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce E. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 81 (2001).
28 Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New Clothes” on the Low-Profit 
Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 886 (2010).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 887.
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passes through to the owners.31 Conversely, shareholders of a corporation are 
shielded from total liability of debt.32 They are liable only to the extent of their 
investment.33 However, corporations are doubly taxed.34 Double taxation causes 
the corporation to be taxed initially on its profits, while the shareholders are also 
taxed on their dividends.35 As a for-profit entity, a corporation, under the 
management of its directors, is bound to pursue the greatest amount of wealth for 
its shareholders.36 Failure to do so can result in directors being held personally 
liable in lawsuits filed by the shareholders.37
In order to close this gap, Wyoming became the first state to pass LLC 
legislation in 1977.38  Now, every state has statutorily enabled LLCs.39  LLCs have 
been considered a type of hybrid entity.40 As a hybrid of corporations and 
partnerships, LLCs have appeal both in taxation and shielded liability.41 Like a 
partnership, all of the income taxes on the revenue fall on its members;42 the LLC 
itself is not liable.43 Members are also able to “participate actively in the 
                                                          
31 Id.
32 Catherine Ann Hilbert, Comment, United States v. Bestfoods: Parent Corporation Liability 
Under CERCLA, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 919, 922 (1999).
33 Id. Hilbert explains the concept of piercing the corporate veil, which would open an investor up 
to total liability.  Id. See generally Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: 
Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329 (2004).
34 Kleinberger, supra note 28, at 887.
35 Id.
36 Mickels, supra note 20, at 282.
37 Id.
38 Thomas M. Madden, Do Fiduciary Duties of Managers and Members of Limited Liability 
Companies Exist As With Majority Shareholders of Closely Held Corporations?, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J.
211, 215 (2010).
39 Kleinberger, supra note 28, at 886; Charles W. Murdock, Limited Liability Companies in the 
Decade of the 1990s: Legislative and Case Law Developments and Their Implications for the Future,
56 BUS. LAW. 499, 499 (2001).  The founders of an LLC must file articles of organization, rather than 
articles of incorporation as a corporation must do, with the state.  Naylor, supra note 26, at 150.  An 
LLC can generally “engage in any lawful business.”  Id.
40 Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 376, 383 (D. Del. 2000) (“LLCs are 
hybrid entities that combine desirable characteristics of corporations, limited partnerships, and general 
partnerships.”); Nw. Energetic Servs., L.L.C. v. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., 159 Cal. App. 4th 841, 852 (Ct. 
App. 2008) (“An LLC is a hybrid entity that offers certain advantages over corporations and 
partnerships, by combining aspects of each.”); Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353, 357 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“As a business entity, limited liability companies are a conceptual hybrid, sharing 
some of the characteristics of partnerships and some of corporations.”);  Thomas Kelley, Law and 
Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 370 (2009); Kleinberger, 
supra note 28, at 886.
41 Jonathan R. Macey, F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium: Limited 
Liability Companies: The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law, 73 WASH. U. L. Q.
433, 434 (1995) (“[T]he purpose of forming [an LLC] is to create an entity that offers investors the 
protections of limited liability and the flow-through tax status of partnerships.”); Murdock, supra note 
39, at 499.
42 Rather than partners or shareholders, owners of an LLC are called members.  Kleinberger, supra
note 28, at 888; Naylor, supra note 26, at 150.
43 See Kelley, supra note 40, at 370; Kleinberger, supra note 28, at 886–87.  LLCs have the tax 
status of a partnership.  Id. at 886.  Partnerships are not taxable entities and experience pass-through 
taxation. Kleinberger, supra note 28, at 887.  Essentially, “[p]artnership profits . . . are deemed to pass 
through to the partners, at which level they are taxed but once.”  Id.
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management of the organization,” creating an advantage over corporations.44 In 
addition, LLCs can create a mission of social good instead of maximizing profits.45  
Similar to a corporation, LLC members have limited liability, and are liable to the 
entity only to the extent of their investment.46
LLCs are considered to have several advantages over corporations, which 
have made them attractive to some entrepreneurs.47 Among the biggest advantage 
is the ability to limit fiduciary duties through the articles of organization or a 
contract.48  The corporation had long been the dominant business entity filed in the 
U.S., even before the first general corporation statute was enacted in 1811 by the 
state of New York.49 In recent years, the LLC has been on the rise, and now 
surpasses the number of corporations formed in the country each year.50  However, 
corporations are still the dominant structure of nonprofit organizations and publicly 
traded companies.51
C.  Constituency Statutes
Many states offer constituency statutes,52 yet California is not one of those 
states.53 Constituency statutes generally allow directors to “consider interests 
                                                          
44 Nw. Energetic Servs. L.L.C., 159 Cal. App. 4th at 852.
45 Celia R. Taylor, Carpe Crisis: Capitalizing on the Breakdown of Capitalism to Consider the 
Creation of Social Businesses, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 743, 752 (2009/2010).
46 See Kleinberger, supra note 28, at 886; Macey, supra note 41, at 435.
47 Taylor, supra note 45, at 751; see also Kelley, supra note 40, at 370–71.
48 Taylor, supra note 45, at 751–52.  The author asserts that “LLC organizers may contractually 
limit or eliminate fiduciary duties of owners and members to each other, to the entity, and to any third 
party to the LLC’s operating agreement.”  Id. at 751.  Other advantages include flexibility in 
management structure and exemption from federal regulations imposed upon publicly traded 
corporations. Id. at 751; see also Kelley, supra note 40, at 370.
49 Rodney D. Chrisman, Essay, LLCs are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of the 
Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004–2007 and 
How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 460 (2010).
50 Id.; Kleinberger, supra note 28, at 886.
51 Chrisman, supra note 49, at 462.
52 Bisconti, supra note 9, at 780.  Pennsylvania was the first state to pass a constituency law in 
1983.  Id. at 781.  Pennsylvania’s statutory language served as a model for other states to follow.  Eric 
W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
14, 27 (1992).  It reads:
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors, 
committees of the board and individual directors of a business corporation may, 
in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider to the extent they 
deem appropriate: (1) The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected 
by such action, including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and 
creditors of the corporation, and upon communities in which offices or 
other establishments of the corporation are located. (2) The short-term and long-
term interests of the corporation, including benefits that may accrue to 
the corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility that these interests 
may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation. (3) The 
resources, intent and conduct (past, stated and potential) of any person seeking to 
acquire control of the corporation. (4) All other pertinent factors.
15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715(a)(1)–(4) (1995).  For an in-depth analysis on the concept of constituency 
statutes, see generally Orts, supra.
53 Bisconti, supra note 9, at 796 (addressing California’s failed attempt to pass a constituency bill).
2012 CALIFORNIA’S FLEXIBLE PURPOSE CORPORATION 307
other than those of their shareholders when exercising their corporate decision-
making authority.”54 The statutes facially look after the welfare of non-
shareholders whose interests are taken into consideration by the corporation’s
directors.  However, the benefit is practically directed toward corporate directors, 
who are shielded from some personal liability if they consider non-shareholder 
interests in making decisions.55
Constituency statutes have been discredited because they merely permit, 
rather than mandate, directors to take non-shareholder interests into account.56  
Therefore, corporations can ignore non-shareholder interests altogether.57 They 
have also been criticized for being limited in their application.58 Enforcement of 
constituency statutes is a contended issue as well.59
D.  Social Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations
Social entrepreneurship has been developing as a movement in recent years, 
aiming to create sustainable organizations that identify social problems and 
specific solutions.60 A social enterprise can take many different forms, but is 
generally structured as either a mission-oriented, for-profit entity or a business-
oriented, nonprofit entity.61 The term “social entrepreneur” was coined by Bill 
                                                          
54 Id. at 781–82; see also BRYAN HORRIGAN, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY: DEBATES, MODELS AND PRACTICES ACROSS GOVERNMENT, LAW AND BUSINESS 207 (2009).
55 See Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate Constituency Statutes 
Under the Takings Clause, 24 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (1998).
56 Bisconti, supra note 9, at 783.  But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756 (West 1994) 
(requiring directors to consider non-shareholder interests).  Still, enforcement of the provision is 
lacking.  Bisconti, supra note 9, at 783.
57 Bisconti, supra note 9, at 783.
58 Mickels, supra note 20, at 292 (“Most constituency statutes limit the definition of stakeholder 
constituents to include customers, suppliers, employees, creditors or the community around which a 
company’s office is located.  This narrow definition does not include the international community, 
environmental concerns or broader human rights concerns. Consequently, decisions made in the 
interest of the broader local community are considerably risky in nature.”).
59 Oswald, supra note 55, at 3 (“[T]he statutes make no provision for enforcement or monitoring 
by the constituency groups whose interests are presumably protected by the statutes.”); see Bisconti, 
supra note 9, at 784.  Bisconti argues that courts have interpreted them “in such a way as to fit them 
into the well-established . . . traditional-duty analysis.” Bisconti, supra note 9, at 784. The traditional 
analysis to which he refers is that of requiring shareholder maximization.  See id. at 780.  Bisconti also 
asserts that constituency statutes will not affect decisions made by corporate directors.  Id. at 798–99.  
His argument comes, in part, in response to the inability of constituents to bring a cause of action 
against corporate directors for failing to act in the constituents’ interests.  Id. at 783.  He states that 
“[t]he lack of an enforcement mechanism leaves directors little choice but to fall back on the traditional 
framework because there is only the risk of a breach of duty claim.”  Id. at 799. Setting a value on 
constituency statutes, Bisconti states that they “function only to the extent that they do not conflict with 
shareholder primacy.”  Id. at 784.
60 It has been characterized as a profession, a field, and a movement.  DAVID BORNSTEIN & SUSAN 
DAVIS, SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 1 (2010).  The authors define 
social entrepreneurship as “a process by which citizens build or transform institutions to advance 
solutions to social problems.”  Id.
61 See Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 59 
(2010); Gottesman, supra note 16, at 345–46.  See also BROMBERGER, supra note 23, at 1 (listing many 
forms including: “business corporations, nonprofit corporations, for-profit subsidiaries of nonprofit 
entities, ‘captive’ charities created by business corporations, [and] joint ventures”).
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Drayton,62 and became known more widely from its use by Ashoka, Drayton’s
nonprofit organization.63 A common problem among social entrepreneurs is 
determining which legal form is best for their venture.64
A modern trend is to create a for-profit entity with a focus on the double or 
triple bottom-line.65 The three bottom-line interests are “economic prosperity, 
environmental quality, and social justice.”66 This concept is commonly called a 
hybrid organization.67 In theory, this type of organization treads against the very 
essence of the for-profit motive.68 The traditional for-profit entity is generally 
bound to act in the best interest of the shareholders.69 For the hybrid organization, 
the benefit to the stakeholder is the dominant purpose, and the company may not 
act if this purpose is not met.70 In general, stakeholders include “employees, 
suppliers, the community, the environment, and shareholders.”71
                                                          
62 Caroline Hsu, Entrepreneur for Social Change, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 21, 2005), http://www.usnews.
com/usnews/news/articles/051031/31drayton.htm.
63 BORNSTEIN, supra note 60, at 18.  Ashoka is an organization dedicated to the support and 
networking of social entrepreneurs, and expansion of the sector.  See generally ASHOKA: INNOVATORS 
FOR THE PUBLIC, http://www.ashoka.org (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).  The organization was founded in 
1980.  Id. It now supports over 2,000 fellows, financially and otherwise, who are social entrepreneurs 
in a variety of ventures.  Id.
64 BROMBERGER, supra note 23, at 2.
65 One law journal article proposed a new type of entity, the not-for-loss corporation.  Jay 
Milbrandt, Comment, A New Form of Business Entity is Needed to Promote Social Entrepreneurship: 
The Not-For-Loss Corporation, 1 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 421, 422 (2008).  Milbrandt also 
characterized this hypothetical entity as a hybrid of for-profit and nonprofit entities.  Id. at 439.  For the 
not-for-loss corporations, he proposed an expansion of the purposes in which nonprofits are now 
limited, to include “social purposes.”  Id. at 440.  However, the “social purposes” definition would still 
be limited in scope.  Id. “The not-for-loss corporation [w]ould return money to investors and reinvest 
the would-be-profit in itself,” however the return on investment would be capped at some point. Id. at 
439–40.  Milbrandt proposed that equity investors would receive a tax break, creating incentive to 
invest in such a corporation.  Id. at 439.  Ultimately, the not-for-loss corporation would require a 
“primary social purpose.”  Id. at 440.
66 Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for 
Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 991 (2009).  The interests are more commonly referred 
to as “people, planet, and profit.”  Id. at 991 n.12; Peter Madsen, Professional, Business Practitioners, 
and Prudential Justice, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 835, 840 (2008); Seema G. Sharma, Corporate Social 
Responsibility in India: An Overview, 43 INT’L LAW. 1515, 1529 (2009); Paulette L. Stenzel, Free 
Trade and Sustainability Through the Lens of Nicaragua, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
653, 658 n.20 (2010).
67 Hybrid organization is a very suitable name.  One entity, the L3C, has been referred to as a “for-
profit [entity] with [a] nonprofit soul,” thus a hybrid of for-profits and not-for-profits.  Frequently Asked 
Questions, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, http://www.americansforcommunity
development.org/faqs.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (follow “1. What is the L3C?” hyperlink).
68 “The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.”  Rakhi I. Patel, Facilitating 
Stakeholder-Interest Maximization: Accommodating Beneficial Corporations in the Model Business 
Corporation Act, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 135, 136 (2010) (quoting Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Sept. 13, 1970), 
http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html).
69 Matthew F. Doeringer, Note, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and International 
Analysis, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 303–04 (2010) (“Once a company issues shares, its board 
and its officers are obligated to look after the interests of the shareholders over all other 
constituencies.”).  See also Mickels, supra note 20, at 282.
70 Patel, supra note 68, at 146.
71 Id. A Minnesota bill identifies stakeholders as shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, 
and creditors.  Id. at 150.
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Hybrid entities do not receive any tax benefit,72 but are able to gain capital 
through investments and distribute money to individuals.73 They are also able to 
receive funding from nonprofit, grant-making organizations.74 This opens the 
floodgates to hybrid organizations and allows financial support to come from 
countless avenues.75
Hybrid organizations have received some raised eyebrows from those who 
doubt that an entity whose primary focus is stakeholders, rather than shareholders, 
can generate capital from traditional investors.76 There are others who consider it 
impossible for corporate decisions to have both positive societal and financial 
impacts without jeopardizing substantial capital.77
E.  Related Hybrid Entities
Some states have already adopted legislation in support of hybrid 
organizations, and many are considering such proposals.78 California’s
                                                          
72 The city of Philadelphia will soon award a tax credit to a limited number of businesses, which
include certified B Corporations, in the near future.  City of Phila. B. No. 090119-A (Phila. 2009) 
(enacted), available at http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/Philadelphia%20
Certified%20Sustainable%20Business%20Ordinance.pdf.  B Corporations will be discussed infra, Part 
II.E.3.  One scholar has argued that for-profit microfinance institutions should receive a tax break.  
Paul, supra note 17 (proposing a new hybrid entity, the Microfinance Limited Partnership).  She 
recognizes that such institutions would be better served as for-profit entities to increase efficiency and 
capital.  Id. at 1392.  Paul also notes that a microfinance institution would perform essentially the same 
function whether it is for profit or not for profit: “provid[ing] public goods that governments would 
otherwise have to supply.”  Id. at 1393.  Therefore, she contended that for-profit microfinance 
institutions should be entitled to the same tax treatment as their nonprofit counterparts.  Id.
73 See Doeringer, supra note 69, at 316 (“the L3C . . . allows the company to issue equity to raise 
capital”); Kelley, supra, note 40, at 344 n.21 (stating that hybrid entities may “distribute part of their 
profits to their owners”); Taylor, supra note 45, at 761 (explaining that L3Cs are able to distribute 
profits to investors).  L3Cs will be discussed infra, Part II.E.2.
74 Cassady V. Brewer & Michael J. Rhim, Using the “L3C” for Program-Related Investments, 21 
TAX’N EXEMPT 11, 11 (2009); Taylor, supra note 45, at 762 (stating that L3Cs may receive program-
related investments).
75 See Brewer & Rhim, supra note 74, at 11 (“The L3C was created to facilitate the flow of both 
private and philanthropic capital to ventures that provide a social benefit.”); Doeringer, supra note 69, 
at 316 (stating that social enterprises can raise “a significant amount of capital”).
76 See Doeringer, supra note 69, at 303 (“Choosing to operate a business with a social purpose 
often involves making choices that can lower the potential to generate economic profits.”).  Doeringer 
concludes his article by arguing that “the L3C’s value will only be realized if government policies 
stimulate capital flows to these organizations and build increased public awareness of the benefits the 
social-enterprise sector can provide.”  Id. at 324.  See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and 
Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619 (2010). Reiser argues that the ability of 
hybrid organizations to gain sufficient capital will depend on a number of factors.  Id. She references 
critics who suggest that the IRS is reluctant to issue a blanket ruling allowing L3Cs to pre-qualify for 
program-related investments.  Id. at 647.  If the IRS were to do so, this would eliminate the cost of 
obtaining a private letter ruling when investing in an L3C, potentially attracting more funding from 
foundations.  Id. at 646–47.  Addressing B Corporations, Reiser believes they are “unlikely to be able to
gain broad access to donations.”  Id. at 650.  She argues that their ability to increase capital “depends 
largely on the success of its branding efforts and the size of the market for [similar] investments.”  Id.
77 See Friedman, supra note 68 (arguing that pursuing social good will only come at the cost of the 
business).
78 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1611 (2010); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-
6C-06 (West 2010); H.B. 594, 151st Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011); S.B. 3011, 2011 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (N.Y. 2011).
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prospective Flexible Purpose Corporation, however, will be the first of its 
particular kind.79 The subsections that follow will detail other types of corporate 
structures that are similar in nature and purpose to the FPC.
1.  Social Businesses
Muhammad Yunus, founder of Grameen Bank, has his own take on social 
enterprise.80 He introduced the social business, which he classifies as a subset of 
social entrepreneurship.81 Yunus describes a social business as a method of using 
the for-profit structure to satisfy social goals.82 Like other hybrid entities, a social 
business would be required to be “created and run for the express purpose of 
pursing specific, articulated social goals, rather than maximizing profit.”83 Yunus 
distinguishes his idea from charities by asserting that social businesses must 
recover all costs.84
Yunus has presented two types of social businesses.85 The first is a standard 
business, but with a social purpose.86  This form he calls a “non-loss, non-dividend 
business.”87 It can be more attractive to investors than making a contribution to a 
nonprofit organization because it provides them with a return equal to their 
investment.88 However, it does not distribute dividends to its investors, so the 
return is strictly limited to the amount of the investment.89 Any profits are 
reinvested into the company, thus providing more capital to carry out the social 
purpose of the business.90
The second type of social business that Yunus identifies puts the business in 
the hands of the poor or disadvantaged.91 Here, the shares are owned by the poor 
or disadvantaged, so profits will be realized by that class of persons.92 An 
example of this type of entity exists in Yunus’ own venture, Grameen Bank.93  
Grameen Bank was created in 1983 for the benefit of the poor population in 
Bangladesh.94 It operates by providing members of the community with small 
                                                          
79 Kyle Westaway, Flexible Purpose Corporation Bill Introduced in CA, SOCENT LAW (Feb. 9, 
2011), http://socentlaw.com/2011/02/flexible-purpose-corporation-bill-introduced-in-ca/.
80 See Taylor, supra note 45, at 767.
81 MUHAMMAD YUNUS, CREATING A WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY: SOCIAL BUSINESS AND THE 
FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 32 (2007).
82 Id. at 21–22.  
83 Taylor, supra note 45, at 767.
84 YUNUS, supra note 81, at 22.
85 Id. at 28.  Yunus notes that it is possible to maintain a social business in both forms 
simultaneously.  Id. at 30.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 24.
88 Id. In order to do so, the company may not incur losses indefinitely.  Id. at 28.  Thus, profit is 
still a goal, but takes a back seat to the social purpose.  
89 YUNUS, supra note 81, at 24.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 28.  In other words, “a social business by virtue of its ownership structure.”  Id. at 30.
92 See id. at 29.
93 Id. at 30.
94 YUNUS, supra note 81, at 44–48.  Poor Bangladeshi women were the target population.  Id.
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loans, which they can use in their own businesses, a practice of microfinance.95  
The loans were made available without the obstacles of collateral, credit history, or 
any legal documents.96
2.  L3Cs
Robert Lang97 introduced the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company (L3C) 
model in 2005 in an effort to increase and diversify capital of organizations 
pursuing a socially beneficial purpose.98 Lang, along with Marcus Owens,99
hoped to establish a for-profit entity that would attract more funding from private 
foundations.100 One hurdle in the progression of L3Cs is the current refusal of the 
IRS to definitively recognize gifts by private foundations to L3Cs as a tax-free 
contribution.101
A foundation is compelled to invest in or grant money to organizations that 
further its primary purpose or suffer a tax penalty.102 Program related investments 
(PRIs) allow foundations to make contributions that are not taxed by the IRS, and 
they allow the foundation an opportunity to make a return on its investment.103  
PRIs must meet the following requirements: (1) the primary purpose of the 
investment is to accomplish a charitable or educational purpose; (2) no significant 
purpose is the production of income or asset appreciation; and (3) no purpose is to 
promote a prohibited political or legislative purpose.104 If an exempt organization 
makes a distribution contrary to these requirements, any return will qualify as 
UBTI.105 The L3C theoretically makes the decision for exempt organizations to 
invest in for-profits easier by placing the primary social purpose in its articles of 
organization, and holding the L3C to that purpose.106 Private foundations may 
                                                          
95 Id. at 48–52.
96 Id. at 48.
97 Lang is the CEO of The Mary Elizabeth and Gordon B. Mannweiler Foundation.  David J. 
Schwister, Note, L3Cs: The Next Big Wave in Socially Responsible Investing or Just Too Good to Be 
True?, 3 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 1, 3 (2009).
98 See Brewer & Rhim, supra note 74, at 11; Robert Lang & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The L3C, 
History, Construct, and Legal Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15, 15–16 (2010).
99 Lang sought the assistance of Owens to draft the L3C legislation in order to best align with IRS 
requirements.  Owens worked for the IRS for ten years, as head of the Exempt Organizations Division.  
Gottesman, supra note 16, at 357; Keatinge, supra note 11, at 582.
100 James R. Hines Jr., Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A 
Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1189 (2010).  See also Kleinberger, supra note 28, at 
883–85; Lang & Minnigh, supra note 98, at 25; The Concept of the L3C, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT, http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/concept.php (last visited Mar. 28, 
2012).
101 See Kleinberger, supra note 28, at 908; see generally, J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, 
The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal 
Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273 (2010).
102 See Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment By Proxy or 
Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 252 (2010).
103 Brewer & Rhim, supra note 74, at 12; The Concept of the L3C, supra note 100.  See Hines et al., 
supra note 100, at 1188 (“A PRI is a combination of a grant and an investment.”).
104 Bishop, supra note 102, at 249. 
105 See Keatinge, supra note 11, at 560–62.
106 Taylor, supra note 45, at 762.
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then be more confident that their investments qualify as PRIs, and will not later be 
taxed.107
The L3C concept appeals primarily to profit-seeking investors by allocating 
different levels of risk and reward.108  In the L3C model, foundations are generally 
expected to accept the highest risk, resulting in the lowest rate of return.109  Instead 
of making a traditional grant, which will provide no return, they are able to have 
the possibility of a return on their invested capital.110 Other investments are of 
normal market risk, and financiers can expect a higher return.111
The L3C was the first hybrid organization to become recognized by law.112  
Rather than creating a new and separate entity, the L3C has been classified as a 
subset of the traditional LLC.113 Several state legislatures have amended their 
LLC statutes to define and regulate L3Cs.114 One drawback for shareholders is 
that L3Cs are subject to tax in the same way as LLCs.115 The L3C itself is not 
taxed.116 Instead, the burden falls on the shareholders, whom are taxed according 
to their respective share of the L3C’s income.117
Each state that recognizes L3Cs generally has the same basic statutory 
parts.118 First, they require significant furtherance of a charitable or educational 
purpose as set forth in IRS provisions that generally govern nonprofit 
organizations, and that purpose must have caused the formation of the company.119  
Next, no significant purpose can be to produce income; however, substantial profit 
alone is insufficient to show that the production of income is a significant 
purpose.120 The last of the basic requirements bans any political or legislative 
                                                          
107 Id.
108 Bishop, supra note 102, at 263; The Concept of the L3C, supra note 100.  See also Brewer & 
Rhim, supra note 74, at 11; Kleinberger, supra note 28, at 884.
109 Bishop, supra note 102, at 263; The Concept of the L3C, supra note 100.  See also Brewer & 
Rhim, supra note 74, at 11.
110 See Kleinberger, supra note 28, at 885.
111 Bishop, supra note 102, at 263; The Concept of the L3C, supra note 100.  See also Brewer & 
Rhim, supra note 74, at 11.
112 Hines et al., supra note 100, at 1189.  Vermont, in 2008, was the first state to pass legislature 
recognizing L3Cs.  Kelley, supra note 40, at 376.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2010).  
Several other states have followed suit, including: Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, 
Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming.  Laws, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/laws.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
113 Brewer & Rhim, supra note 74, at 11; Lang & Minnigh, supra note 98, at 20; Laws, supra note 
112.
114 Kelley, supra note 40, at 376.
115 Brewer & Rhim, supra note 74, at 15.
116 Id.
117 Id.  Lang recognizes two other problems with the L3C—”misinformation and [a] lack of 
information.”  Lang & Minnigh, supra note 98, at 29.  However, he does hope that people will give the 
entity a chance to prove its worth.  Id. at 30.  He also suggests that people “do not stifle them before 
they have a chance to blossom.” Id.
118 Taylor, supra note 45, at 762 (noting that the Vermont statute is “representative of other 
jurisdictions”).
119 Bishop, supra note 102, at 247.  See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2010); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1611 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4102(2)(m) (West 2010); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(C) (2010).
120 See Bishop, supra note 102, at 247.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B) (2010) (“No 
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purpose from being a goal of the company.121  These statutes also generally require 
that the L3C or purpose designation be stated in the articles of incorporation or its 
equivalent.122
3.  Benefit Corporations
The nonprofit organization B Lab123 is responsible for the recent additions to 
the business corporations statutes of Maryland, Vermont, and several other states. 
124  B Lab was created in an effort to develop a new economic sector that “uses the 
power of business to solve social and environmental problems.”125  Certification as 
a B Corporation has been attractive to some businesses because it brands them as a 
“good company.”126
Pennsylvania has not passed a state law recognizing B Corporations as a 
                                                          
significant purpose of the company is the production of income or the appreciation of property; 
provided, however, that the fact that a person produces significant income or capital appreciation shall 
not, in the absence of other factors, be conclusive evidence of a significant purpose involving the 
production of income or the appreciation of property.”).  See also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 
(2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1611 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4102(2)(m) (West 
2010).
121 Bishop, supra note 102, at 247–48. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2010); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1611 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4102(2)(m) (West 2010); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (C) (2010).  Note that these requirements are parallel to those of the PRI.  See 
supra text accompanying note 104
122 See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26(b) (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
450.4102(2)(m) (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3023(a) (2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-
102(a)(ix) (West 2010).
123 Jay Coen Gilbert founded B Lab in 2006 along with Bart Houlahan and Andrew Kassoy.   Co-
Founders, CERTIFIED B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net/team (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).  
Gilbert and Houlahan also established the AND 1 empire, a basketball apparel company, so they are no 
strangers to successful business operations.  Id. B Lab certifies qualifying businesses as “B 
Corporations.”  What is a B Corp?, CERTIFIED B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net/about 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2012). To qualify, a company must “legally expand the responsibilities of the 
corporation to include the interests of its employees, suppliers, consumers, community, and 
environment.”  FAQ, CERTIFIED B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net/faq (last visited Mar. 
28, 2012).  In addition, a corporation must meet the standards set forth in the “B Impact Assessment.”  
See id. A sample report may be found at B Impact Assessment 2010, CERTIFIED B CORPORATION,
http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/2010-B-Impact-Assessment%20(1).pdf (last
visited Mar. 28, 2012).  The first section analyzes the company’s accountability through its governance 
and transparency.  Id. at 3–4.  The next step evaluates employee care in compensation and benefits, 
employee ownership, and work environment.  Id. at 4–8.  The next section considers any benefit to 
consumers through beneficial products and services.  Id. at 9–10.  Next, the community is examined, 
taking into account suppliers, local participation, diversity, and commitment to service.  Id. at 10–15.  
Lastly, the environmental impact is taken into account, with consideration of facilities, energy usage, 
the supply chain, and manufacturing methods. Id. at 22–24.
124 See State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.
benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
125 Why B Corps Matter, CERTIFIED B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net/why (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2012).
126 See FAQ, CERTIFIED B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net/faq (last visited Mar. 28, 
2012).  In addition, B Corporations receive discounts on products and services from some providers.  
See id.  Depending on a B Corporation’s sales, the annual fee for certification is as menial as $500 to as 
much as $25,000.  Make it Official and Sign B Corp Documents, CERTIFIED B CORPORATION,
http://www.bcorporation.net/become/official (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
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separate legal entity.127 Nevertheless, the city of Philadelphia has taken its own 
initiative, and will give tax credit to a number of eligible B Corporations.128 No 
other municipality thus far has legislation that specifically names B Corporations 
as eligible for tax breaks or other business advantages.129
It was not until April of 2010 that the first state, Maryland, signed into law a 
concept similar to the B Corporation.130 The model legislation, advocated by B 
Lab, names such an entity as a Benefit Corporation, and is only applicable to those 
labeled as such.131 It requires the purpose for formation of a Benefit Corporation 
to be for a “general public benefit.”132 The statutory language defines general 
public benefit as “a material positive impact on society and the environment, taken 
as a whole, as assessed against a 3rd-party standard, as defined, that satisfies 
certain requirements.”133 The corporation may indicate a specific public benefit, 
but still requires the general benefit as well.134 In addition, the general and 
specific public benefits must be in the best interest of the corporation.135
Directors of a Benefit Corporation have a duty to consider all of the 
following when making decisions: (1) the interests of shareholders; (2) the 
interests of employees and workforce of the Benefit Corporation, its subsidiaries 
and suppliers; (3) the interests of customers as beneficiaries of the public benefit 
purposes; (4) community and societal considerations; and (5) the local and global 
environment.136 Paralleling traditional corporations, directors of a Benefit 
Corporation can be held liable for failing to pursue the enumerated public 
                                                          
127 See B Corp Legislation, CERTIFIED B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net/publicpolicy 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (noting that the legislature is considering a draft of Benefit Corporation 
materials).
128 The bill amended Philadelphia Code § 19-2604 to allow up to twenty-five businesses in the city 
to receive a tax credit of $4,000.  PHILA. CODE § 19-2604(13).  To be eligible, a business must be 
certified by the Office of Sustainability as a Sustainable Business. Id. B Lab certification will serve as 
prima facie evidence of status as a Sustainable Business.  Id.
129 See B Corp Legislation, supra note 127 (“[T]he City of Philadelphia passed legislation creating 
the country’s first tax break for certified sustainable business.”).
130 The governor signed the bill into law on April 13, 2010.  S.B. 690, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 
2010), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2010rs/billfile/sb0690.htm.  Seven states now legally 
recognize Benefit Corporations: California, Hawaii, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, and 
Virginia.  See State by State Legislative Status, supra note 124.
131 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.02(a) (2010); Provisions Relating to The Incorporation and 
Governance of Benefit Corporations, PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.bcorporation.net/
resources/bcorp/documents/Draft_Pennsylvania-Legislation.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).  This 
document is found through a link for “Model Legislation” on the Certified B Corporation website.
132 MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-06(a); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.08(a) (2010).
133 H.R. 361, 2011 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_0351-0400/ab_361_bill_20110830_enrolled.pdf; see also MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(c); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(4) (2010).
134 H.R. 361, 2011 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); see also MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
ASS’NS § 5-6C-06(b) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.08(b) (2010).
135 H.R. 361, at § 14610(c).
136 H.R. 361, at § 14620(b); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07(a)(1); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(1) (2010).  The California bill also includes the duty of consideration of the short 
and long-term interests of the Benefit Corporation and the ability to accomplish the public benefit 
purposes.  Assemb. B. 301 at § 14610(c)(6)–(7).  It is important to note that under the Vermont statute, 
“[a] director is not liable for the failure of a [B]enefit [C]orporation to create general or specific public 
benefit.” Tit. 11A, § 21.09(c).
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purposes.137 Stakeholders with no ownership interest in the corporation, however, 
do not have the absolute right to bring such a claim.138
There are also reporting requirements to which a Benefit Corporation must 
adhere.139  It must send an annual report to each shareholder within 120 days of the 
end of its fiscal year.140 The report must include: (1) the means of pursuing the 
general public benefit and the extent that the general public benefit was produced; 
(2) the means of pursuing the specific public benefit, if any stated in the articles of 
incorporation, and the extent that the specific pubic benefit was produced; (3) any 
circumstances that have impeded the production of the public benefit; and (4) “an 
assessment of the societal and environmental performance of the Benefit 
Corporation prepared in accordance with a third-party standard applied 
consistently with the prior year’s benefit report or accompanied by an explanation 
of the reasons for any inconsistent application.”141 The third-party standard refers 
to a “standard for defining, reporting, and assessing best practices in corporate 
social and environmental performance that: (1) [i]s developed by a person or entity 
that is independent of the [B]enefit [C]orporation; and (2) [i]s transparent because 
[certain] information about the standard is publicly available or accessible.”142
4.  California Assembly Bill 2944
The Benefit Corporation was not B Lab’s first attempt at influencing 
legislation.143 In 2008, the state of California considered a bill that would allow 
corporate board members to take into account the impact on the environment and 
                                                          
137 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13(2010).  A traditional corporation, which seeks primarily 
profits, holds directors personally liable for failing to act in the best interest of the shareholders through 
pursuit of profit.  W. DERRICK BRITT ET AL., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS—PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CALIFORNIA CORPORATIONS CODE FOR  A NEW CORPORATE FORM: THE 
FLEXIBLE PURPOSE CORPORATION (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://businessforgood.blogspot.
com/2011/03/frequently-asked-questions-proposed.html.  A Benefit Corporation, which seeks primarily 
a public benefit, holds directors personally liable for failing to act in the best interest of the stakeholders 
through pursuit of the public purpose.  See tit. 11A, § 21.13.
138 See tit. 11A, § 21.13(b).  The section reads:
A benefit enforcement proceeding may be commenced or maintained only by: (1) 
a shareholder that would otherwise be entitled to commence or maintain a 
proceeding in the right of the benefit corporation on any basis; (2) a director of 
the corporation; (3) a person or group of persons that owns beneficially or of 
record 10 percent or more of the equity interests in an entity of which the benefit 
corporation is a subsidiary; or (4) such other persons as may be specified in the 
articles of incorporation of the benefit corporation.
Id.
139 See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08 (West 2011).
140 Id. at § 5-6C-08(b).
141 Id. at § 5-6C-08(a).  The Vermont statute includes a few more reporting requirements.  See VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14 (2010).
142 MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(e) (West 2011).  It is feasible that B Lab would 
satisfy the third party requirement.
143 Amy Westervelt, A New Corporation for a New Economy, CERTIFIED B CORPORATION,
http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/2009AP-New-Corporation.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2012).
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the community when making decisions.144 The bill would essentially allow 
corporate directors to determine what is in the best interest of the corporation by 
considering “the long-term and the short-term interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders, the corporation’s employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors, 
community and societal considerations, and the environment.”145
Assembly Bill 2944 took the form of a conventional constituency statute.146  
After several amendments, the bill passed through both houses in just over six 
months.147 However, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed the 
bill,148 and social responsibility was not revisited in California until Senate Bill 
1463—the Flexible Purpose Corporation.
III. FLEXIBLE PURPOSE CORPORATIONS
After Schwarzenegger’s veto of Assembly Bill 2944, several lawyers came 
together in a fresh effort to “facilitate the organization of companies in California 
with greater flexibility for combining profitability with a broader social or 
environmental purpose.”149 As a result, the California Working Group for New 
Corporate Forms (Group) was created in the summer of 2008.150 The Group 
consisted of ten corporate attorneys of diverse backgrounds, in an effort to prevent 
bias by any particular subset of the corporate field.151
A.  The Profit—Social Gap
The Group was concerned about the gap that caused a dilemma for 
businesses seeking to satisfy both social-benefit and profit-making missions: 
choosing between a for-profit and nonprofit form.152 Under California’s General 
                                                          
144 The California State Legislature introduced Assembly Bill No. 2944 on February 22, 2008.  
H.R. 2944, 2008 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-
08/bill/asm/ab_2901-2950/ab_2944_bill_20080222_introduced.pdf.  For the finalized version of the 
bill, see H.R. 2944 (amended), 2008 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_2901-
2950/ab_2944_bill_20080822_amended_sen_v95.pdf.
145 BRITT ET AL., supra note 137.
146 See supra Part II.C.
147 See Complete Bill History, http://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_2901-2950/
ab_2944_bill_20080930_history.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
148 Id.
149 BRITT ET AL., supra note 137.  This document was created by co-chairs of the Group in order to 
accompany the FPC proposal in the California legislature.  Id.
150 Id.
151 See id.
152 See id.; see also Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma, 35
VT. L. REV. 105 (2010). Reiser acknowledges the gap and later analyzes the rising sector of hybrid 
organizations in bridging that gap.  Id. To explain the problem, she expresses that:
Until recently, the law has compelled those who desire a blended enterprise to 
adopt either a charity or a business form of governance.  Once formed, an entity’s 
leaders must attempt to use a single mission form to govern their blended 
enterprise.  Yet, neither the traditional charity form . . . nor any of the traditional 
business forms . . . is particularly well-suited to doing so.
Id. at 106.
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Corporation Law, in pertinent part, directors of a corporation have a duty to act in 
the best interest of the shareholders.153 This generally includes a fiduciary duty, 
requiring directors to maintain the primary objective of maximizing shareholder 
value.154 This creates potential problems for businesses that practice corporate 
social responsibility.155 Often, practicing corporate social responsibility can only 
come at the expense of profit to the shareholders.156
If directors make a decision with stakeholders in mind, any negative effect 
can be attributed to those directors.  Absent invocation of the business judgment 
rule, 157 directors are potentially liable in a lawsuit brought by shareholders.158  
However, courts tend to presume that the business judgment rule applies.159  
Therefore, the Group notes that corporations have some flexibility in considering 
special purposes for long-term advantages to the corporation and shareholders.160
A major difficulty the Group recognized was that when control of the 
company changes, there is no guarantee that the socially responsible aspect will 
continue.161 The Group refers to the lack of a “mission anchor” when control 
changes hands.162 The new owners may not have the enthusiasm nor the incentive 
to sustain a social mission.163 In acknowledging this concern, the drafters of the 
                                                          
153 CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 2008).
154 See BRITT ET AL., supra note 137; see also Bisconti, supra note 9, at 765 (asserting that the 
traditional corporate model “limits directors’ fiduciary duties to one simple goal: obtaining the highest 
value possible for shareholders”); Schwister, supra note 97, at 11.
155 See Taylor, supra note 45, at 751 (“[T]o the extent that CSR proponents make inroads into the 
shareholder-primacy, profit-maximization model, their progress will always be constrained.”).
156 In a rather outdated news article, Milton Friedman openly criticized businessmen who 
attempted to practice social responsibility.  See generally Friedman, supra note 68.  In his book, 
Friedman describes corporate social responsibility as such:
[in a free economic society], there is one and only one social responsibility of 
business–to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its 
profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in 
open and free competition without deception or fraud.
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (40th ed. 2002); but see
Elena F Pérez Carrillo, Corporate Governance: Shareholders’ Interests and Others Stakeholders’ 
Interests, 4 CORP. OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 96, 101 (2007), available at http://www.virtusinterpress.
org/additional_files/journ_coc/full-text-papers-open-access/Paper006.pdf (stating that “[c]orporations’ 
acknowledgement of their [s]ocial  [r]esponsibilities can be very satisfactory for [s]hareholder’s long-
term interests,” and “ interests of most stakeholders may coincide with those of shareholders and the 
[c]ompany”).
157 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 2008).  The code does not specifically set forth a “business 
judgment rule,” but it is widely known as such.  Section 309(c) exempts a director from liability who 
has relied on information from a dependable source.  Directors are also excused from liability for 
damages if the articles of incorporation set forth a provision satisfying section 204(a)(10).  The rule 
creates a “presumption that in making business decisions the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that action taken was in best interest of the 
company.”  Mickels, supra note 20, at 283.
158 See Bisconti, supra note 9, at 773 (“[D]irectors can be held personally liable for breaching their 
fiduciary duties.”).




163 Reiser, supra note 152, at 106.  “[T]he market creates serious practical pressure for business 
managers to maximize profits, rather than pursue social objectives.  Failing to do so may result in 
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proposal note that: “The traditional corporate form also presents a risk for the 
entrepreneur seeking to maintain the mission of a [s]pecial [p]urpose during the 
life of an early-stage corporation because investors may shift the company away 
from the original Special Purpose over time in favor of additional profitability 
instead.”164 The Group was insistent on creating a business entity in which its 
founders could have faith in knowing that their social mission would carry on.
B.  The Dynamics of an FPC
In November of 2009, the Group completed a draft of the proposal for a new 
corporate entity, the FPC, which it hoped would sufficiently combine profitability 
with a “special purpose.”165 The proposal would “encourage and expressly permit 
companies to be formed[,] or converted from other forms[,] to pursue one or more 
purposes [while] creating economic value for shareholders.”166 FPCs under this 
proposal would remain subjects of the General Corporation Law, but would adhere 
only to the extent required by the impending FPC statutory provisions.167  The core 
component of an FPC is that its articles of incorporation must identify at least one 
special purpose to be considered in determining the best interest of the corporation 
and its shareholders.168 By allowing consideration of the special purpose along 
with the shareholders’ financial interest, directors will be shielded from potential 
personal liability for a breach of fiduciary duty.169
On February 19, 2010, the FPC was introduced into the California Senate as 
Senate Bill 1463 by Senator Mark DeSaulnier.170 Initially, the bill sought to add a 
new division to the California Corporations Code (Code).171 It was amended on 
April 5, 2010 to add to and amend other sections of the Code as well.172 Under 
California’s Senate Bill 1463, Title I of the Code would be expanded to include 
                                                          
business reverses and loss of market share, undermine investor-confidence, and perhaps cause managers 
to lose their positions.”  Id. at 106–07.
164 Flexible Purpose Corporations: Fact Sheet, OFFICE OF SENATOR MARK DESAULNIER 1, 1 (Feb. 
19, 2010), http://sd07.senate.ca.gov/sites/sd07.senate.ca.gov/files/PDF/Legislation/2010/SB%
201463%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
165 Id.  The definition of “special purpose” for the sake of California Senate Bill 1463 will be 
discussed infra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
166 BRITT ET AL., supra note 137.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 5.  This presents a second “bottom line” for the directors to focus on.  See infra note 249.
169 BRITT ET AL., supra note 137.
170 S.B. 1463, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) at 1, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1451-1500/sb_1463_bill_20100219_introduced.pdf.  Senator DeSaulnier is a 
Democrat and represents the Seventh District of California.  See Biography, SENATOR MARK 
DESAULNIER, http://sd07.senate.ca.gov/biography (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).  He is currently in his 
first term in the Senate, but previously served in the State Assembly.  Id.  The Group sponsored the bill.  
FACT SHEET, supra note 164, at 2.
171 See Cal. S.B. 1463 at 1.
172 S.B. 1463, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (amended) at 1, available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1451-1500/sb_1463_bill_20100405_amended_sen_
v98.pdf.  To view the amended sections of the code regarding FPCs, see id. at 1–20.  See id. for the 
entire text of Cal. S.B. 1463.  The remainder of this Comment will focus on the new division proposed.
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Division 1.5, the Corporate Flexibility Act of 2010.173 The Division would only 
apply to corporations that were organized as an FPC under Division 1.5, or were 
appropriately converted into an FPC.174
Section 2602 sets forth the requirements of the articles of incorporation.175  
First, the term “Flexible Purpose Corporation” must be included.176 Next, the 
articles must specify the general and special purposes in which the FPC is to be 
involved.177 A special purpose is required to fall under at least one of the 
following umbrellas: (1) “[o]ne or more charitable or public purpose activities that 
a nonprofit public benefit corporation is authorized to carry out”; or (2) “promoting 
positive short-term or long-term effects of, or minimizing adverse short-term or 
long-term effects of, the flexible purpose corporation’s activities upon . . . the 
FPC’s employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors[,] the community and 
society[,] or the environment.”178 The bill sets out two separate paragraphs in 
which to present the general purpose of the FPC, either of which must be included 
in the articles.179 Both paragraphs emphasize a goal in producing both long-term 
and short-term benefits.180
When making executive decisions, Senate Bill 1463 would allow directors to 
consider “the short-term and long-term prospects of the [FPC], the best interests of 
the [FPC] and its shareholders, and the purposes of the [FPC] as set forth in its 
articles.”181 This provision goes to the root of the problem that the Group sought 
to resolve; it requires that a public purpose be included in the articles of 
incorporation.182 This provision would shield directors from potential personal 
liability for failing to act in the financial best interest of the shareholders while 
pursuing the public purpose of the FPC.183
Directors of an FPC, like those of a traditional corporation, would still be 
subject to personal liability if they do not act in the best interest of the corporation
or its shareholders.184 Also in conformity with a traditional corporation, an FPC’s
articles of incorporation may not limit a director’s duty to act in the FPC’s best 
interest.185 In the event that a director may be held personally liable for 
                                                          
173 See Cal. S.B. 1463 (amended) at 21.
174 Id. at § 2502.
175 See id. at § 2602.
176 Id. at § 2602(a).
177 Id. at § 2602(b).
178 See S.B. 1463, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (amended), at § 2602(b)(2).
179 See id. at § 2602(b)(1).
180 Id. The remaining requirements of the articles of incorporation are beyond this discussion.
181 Id. at § 2700(c).
182 Id. at § 2602(b)(2).
183 It is important to note that this will “not eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any act 
or omission occurring prior to the date on which the provision becomes effective.”  S.B. 1463, 2010 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (amended), at § 2603(a)(10)(B).
184 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 204 (West 2008); S.B. 1463, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) 
(amended), at § 2603(a)(10)(A).
185 Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 204 (“[Provisions set forth in the articles of incorporation] may 
not eliminate or limit the liability of directors . . . for acts or omissions that a director believes to be 
contrary to the best interests of the corporation or its shareholders.”), with Cal. S.B. 1463 (amended), at 
§ 2603(a)(10)(A) (“[Provisions set forth in the articles of incorporation] may not eliminate or limit the 
320 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. V:II
unacceptable actions, section 2715 of Senate Bill 1463 identifies the parties that 
may bring a legal claim.186 Under the bill, only creditors or shareholders may 
bring a legal action against a director of an FPC.187
Chapter 11 of Division 1.5 lays out the reporting requirements of an FPC.188  
Similar to a traditional corporation in California, an FPC must send an annual 
report to its shareholders within 120 days of the fiscal year end.189 However, in 
addition to the cash flow and income statements, as required of traditional 
corporations, an FPC must also include a “management discussion and analysis . . .
concerning [its] stated [special] purpose.”190 This section of the report must 
include: (1) “an identification and discussion of the short-term and long-term 
objectives of the [FPC] relating to its special purpose or purposes, and an 
identification and explanation of any changes made in those special purpose 
objectives during the fiscal year”; (2) “an identification and discussion of the 
material actions taken . . . during the fiscal year to achieve its special purpose 
objectives, the impact of those actions . . . and the extent to which those actions 
achieved the special purpose objectives for the fiscal year”; (3) “identification of 
material actions [and their intended impact,] that the  [FPC] expects to take in the 
short term and long term [to achieve] its special purpose objectives”; (4) “a
description of the process for selecting, and an identification and description of . . .
other measures used by the [FPC] during the fiscal year for evaluating its 
performance in achieving its special purpose objective”; and (5):
an identification and discussion of any material operating and capital expenditures 
incurred . . . in furtherance of achieving the special purpose objectives, [along with 
an] estimate of any additional material operating or capital expenditures the [FPC] 
expects to incur over the next three fiscal years in order to achieve its special 
purpose objectives, and other material expenditures of resources incurred by the 
[FPC] during the fiscal year . . . in furtherance of achieving the special purpose 
objectives, including a discussion of the extent to which that capital or use of other 
resources serves purposes other than and in addition to furthering the achievement 
of the special purpose objectives.191
The bill also requires a special purpose current report to be sent to 
shareholders in certain situations.192 If an “expenditure has or is likely to have a 
material adverse impact on the [FPC]’s results of operations or financial condition 
for a quarterly or annual fiscal period,” such a report should include:
[an] identif[ication] and discuss[ion of] . . . any expenditure . . . , excluding 
                                                          
liability of directors . . . for acts or omissions that a director believes to be contrary to the best interests 
of the flexible purpose corporation or its shareholders and its corporate purposes as expressed in its 
articles.”) (emphasis added).
186 Cal. S.B. 1463 (amended) at § 2715(c).
187 Id.
188 Id. at 67.
189 CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501(a)(1) (West 2008); S.B. 1463, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) 
(amended), at § 3500(a).
190 Cal. S.B. 1463 (amended), at § 3500(b).
191 Id.
192 See id. at § 3501(a).
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compensation of officers and directors, made in furtherance of the special purpose 
objectives[;] whether [it is classified as] an operating expenditure, a capital 
expenditure, or some other expenditure of corporate resources, including employee 
time or otherwise[;] whether the expenditure was direct or indirect[;] and whether 
the expenditure was made to a person or entity outside of the flexible purpose 
corporation or was made internally.193
The bill did not survive the legislative term.194 The FPC was reintroduced 
by Senator DeSaulnier on February 8, 2011 as Senate Bill 201—The Corporate 
Flexibility Act of 2011.195 The remaining sections of this Comment will reference 
Cal. S.B. 201.196
IV. ANALYSIS
There are several components in each of the hybrid organizations that differ.  
Each type is composed of some factors that are more favorable than those in
another hybrid type.  This section will compare those factors, and determine which 
entity is most advantageous on that matter.
A.  Organizational Structure
The most important place to start in the comparison of social enterprises is 
their entity classification.  Both FPCs and Benefit Corporations are separate 
entities, which fall within the Code for Corporations.197 L3Cs, on the other hand, 
are a subset of LLCs.198 Despite their differences, all of these entities are subject 
to the same laws as their strictly for-profit counterparts.199 The key difference, 
however, exists in the selection of either a corporation or LLC form.  Each 
organizational structure has its advantages and drawbacks.200
Structurally, the FPC is identical to Yunus’ Social Business concept.201  
                                                          
193 Id. at § 3501(b).  The report must be distributed within forty-five days of the event, but 
distribution is not required if the information is included in the last annual report.  Id. at § 3500.
194 Allen Matkins, The Flexible Purpose Corporation – Can It Serve Two Masters?, CAL. CORP. &
SEC. LAW (Feb. 10, 2011), http://calcorporatelaw.com/2011/02/the-flexible-purpose-corporation-can-it-
serve-two-masters/.
195 Id. See also Joel Makower, California’s Bold Move To Legitimize Sustainable Business,
GREENBIZ.COM (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2011/02/14/california%E2%80%99s-
move-legalize-sustainable-business.
196 S.B. 201, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
12/bill/sen/sb_0201-0250/sb_201_bill_20110208_introduced.pdf.
197 See BRITT ET AL., supra note 137; MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-06(a) (West 
2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.08(a) (2010).
198 Lang & Minnigh, supra note 98, at 20; Laws, supra note 112.
199 See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-02(a) (West 2011) (“The provisions of the 
Maryland General Corporation Law apply to benefit corporations . . . .”); Cal. S.B. 201, at § 2501 
(“[T]he provisions of [the General Corporation Law] shall apply to corporations organized under [the 
Corporate Flexibility Act of 2010.]); Brewer & Rhim, supra note 74, at 14 (“[T]he L3C should be 
treated in the same manner as an LLC.”).
200 See supra Part II.D.
201 See supra Part II.E.1.
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Specifically, the “non-loss, non-dividend” Social Business is comparable.202 Both 
entities would be run as a profit-making business, and would recoup costs.  The 
Social Business, however, would not adhere to a primary purpose of pursuing 
profit.203 In fact, none of the shareholders would expect a profit; they would only 
expect to be distributed an amount equal to their investment.204 The rest of the 
earnings would be reinvested back into the business.205 The FPC is very different 
in this sense.  Shareholders would hope to receive a profit from their investment, 
since the primary purpose can be pursuing profits.  Based on this evaluation, the 
FPC would most likely be able to attract more capital from investors, because they 
will expect a return on their investment.  However, if the owners of the business 
are more interested in pursuing a social goal, the Social Business would be a more 
appropriate choice of entity.
The FPC closely resembles constituency statutes that many states have 
enacted.206  Both arrangements effectively shield corporate directors from personal 
liability in the event that a decision is made with consideration of factors other than 
shareholder maximization.207 The major difference lies in the aspect of 
incorporation.  Corporations governed by constituency statutes have the option to 
consider nonshareholder interests, which are generally not established in the 
articles of corporation.208 Inherently, such corporations can wholly overlook 
nonshareholder interests.209 On the contrary, FPCs may not be formed without 
enumerating the public purpose in the incorporating document.  This requirement 
may cause directors to more fully appreciate their commitment to benefiting 
stakeholders.  California’s attempt to create a constituency statute may have
extended further than other states have reached.
B.  Profit Maximization
In addition to maximizing profits, social enterprises generally consider other 
factors in corporate decision making that lead them to prefer one form over 
another.210 This alternative consideration could result in a reduction in the 
potential profit.  L3Cs actually preclude profit-making from being an objective of 
the entity.211 In order to combat this potential downside, profit-maximization 
schemes are essential in assuring an enterprise’s sustainability.
L3Cs promote the grant of money from foundations in the form of PRIs.212  
                                                          
202 See id.
203 Taylor, supra note 45, at 767.
204 YUNUS, supra note 81, at 24.
205 Id.
206 Assembly Bill 2944 was more closely related to conventional constituency statutes.  See H.R. 
2944, 2008 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008) (amended).  Senate Bill 201 pushes California’s 
attempt at a constituency statute to a deeper level, discussed infra.
207 See BRITT ET AL., supra note 137; HORRIGAN, supra note 54, at 206–08.
208 Bisconti, supra note 9, at 783; HORRIGAN, supra note 54, at 207.
209 Bisconti, supra note 9, at 783.
210 See Reiser, supra note 152, at 108 (referring to the “dual mission” of hybrid organizations).
211 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B) (2010).
212 See supra text accompanying notes 102–07.
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L3Cs may appeal to grant-making foundations because their social purpose is 
presented in their articles of organization.213 Similarly, FPCs would lay out their 
special purpose in the articles of incorporation.214 The distinguishing 
characteristic is that the organizing requirements of an L3C mirror the 
requirements of a PRI.215 In contrast, FPCs are incorporated in a more similar 
manner to a traditional corporation, specifically pursuing profits as a dominant 
goal.  Thus, since PRIs are explicitly barred from allowing a significant purpose of 
the investment to produce income,216 it is highly unlikely that an FPC will ever be 
able to receive foundation funding based in a PRI.
C.  Tax Treatment
Since hybrid entities do not hold tax exemption status, a favorable tax 
arrangement would be sensible in maximizing profits as well.217 Adhering to the 
same laws as an LLC, the L3C would experience pass-through taxation.218  
Therefore, profits of the company would only be taxed once.  Alternatively, the 
FPC and Benefit Corporation are subject to double taxation—once on the 
corporation’s profits, and again on the dividends.219 From the standpoint of 
maximizing profits by minimizing taxes, the L3C appears to be a more favorable 
selection.
D.  Degree of Importance and Specificity of the Social Benefit
Senate Bill 201 goes a step further than Assembly Bill 2944.  Assembly Bill 
2944 did not seek to create a new entity.220  It simply would have allowed directors 
of corporations as a whole to take social interests into consideration when making 
executive decisions.221 Therefore, all corporations would enjoy the benefit of the 
new bill.222 However, Senate Bill 201 benefits would be limited to those 
companies that organize as an FPC.
                                                          
213 Taylor, supra note 45, at 762.
214 S.B. 201, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), at § 2602(b).
215 Compare supra text accompanying note 104, with supra text accompanying notes 119–21.
216 Bishop, supra note 102, at 249.
217 Some states have attempted to provide tax benefits to hybrid organizations.  Kelley, supra note 
40, at 368.  In 2006, the Hawaii legislature considered a bill to create a hybrid entity called the Socially 
Responsible Business Corporation.  Id. In its final draft, the bill sought to “create tax incentives for 
corporations that include a certain percentage of employees and members of the community on their 
boards of directors.”  Tom Brandt, Socially/Environmentally “Responsible” Business Incentives Not 
Bad Idea, Just New, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN (Apr. 23, 2006), available at http://cog.kent.edu/lib/
BrandtSociallyRespBusiness.pdf.  It would provide “relief from state corporate income taxes for 
corporations formed under the law.”  Kelley, supra note 40, at 368.  The Responsible Business 
Corporation Act passed through both houses, but was rejected by the governor.  Id.
218 Kleinberger, supra note 28, at 886–87.
219 Id. at 887.
220 See H.R. 2944, 2008 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008) (amended).
221 Id.
222 See BRITT ET AL., supra note 137.  The benefit being referred to is the ability of directors to not 
be held personally liable for considering social, rather than just financial, effects of an executive 
decision.
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In relation to the stricken Assembly Bill 2944, the FPC bill may have the 
effect of encouraging businesses to incorporate as a new entity.  As an FPC, they 
would be required to have a special purpose in order to reap the benefit.  For 
corporations as a whole, Assembly Bill 2944 would have been a better solution.  
They would not have to take any action to have the bill apply to them.  For the 
state, the FPC is a better solution because corporations that are subject to the bill 
would be required to have a special purpose included in their articles of 
incorporation.  If corporations take heed of the encouragement to incorporate as an 
FPC, the community will in turn benefit from the special purpose being carried 
out.
FPCs are a step back from existing hybrid entities.  L3Cs and Benefit 
Corporations essentially require their primary purpose to be that of social 
welfare.223 The L3C must have a charitable or educational purpose as the primary 
goal.224 Furthermore, it bans such entities from having a significant purpose to 
produce income.225 FPCs, on the other hand, would not only be permitted to 
produce income as a primary purpose, but it seems that it would be expected.226  
Other than inclusion of the special purpose, all other aspects of the articles of 
incorporation are to mirror traditional corporations.  Similar to L3Cs, Benefit 
Corporations must have a general public benefit as the overarching reason for 
creation of the entity.227 The FPC, however, takes a more particular stance than 
the Benefit Corporation on the requirements of its social purpose.  Rather than 
placing a general benefit on society, FPCs are required to specify which social 
benefit they will work to satisfy.228 This difference becomes important when 
measuring the effectiveness of a corporation in achieving a social benefit.229
A general public benefit is a very broad standard and may be difficult to 
evaluate.  For instance, all corporations provide some sort of societal benefit in 
providing products or services.  When a benefit is specifically identified, as would 
be required of an FPC, it seems more likely to be accurately measured.  Benefit 
Corporations have the choice of identifying a specific public benefit, but again, 
only the general benefit is required.  In consideration of the specificity of the social 
purpose, FPCs appear more equipped than Benefit Corporations to be accountable 
for achieving their purpose.  
E.  Accountability and Enforcement
Todd Johnson, a partner at Jones Day law firm and former advisor to B Lab, 
                                                          
223 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1611 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.08 (2010).
224 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1611(1) (2010).
225 Tit. 31, § 1611(2)(C).
226 The bill only requires that “a purpose” of an FPC be social in nature.  See S.B. 201, 2011 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal 2011), at § 2602(b)(2).
227 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.08 (2010).
228 See id. Benefit Corporations have the option of enumerating a specific public purpose, but are 
not required by statute.  MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-02(b) (West 2011).
229 See Lang & Minnigh, supra note 98, at 29 (“It is harder to measure social good.”).
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addressed the accountability methods of FPCs.230  In his blog post, Johnson asserts 
that “the ‘[B]enefit [C]orporation’ form seeks to create accountability (beyond 
reporting) through a system of greater liability, whereas the ‘[FPC]’ form seeks to 
unleash directors from the risk of liability.”231 He states that the reduction of the 
risk of liability will allow directors to more broadly experiment with 
simultaneously “doing well and doing good.”232 If the FPC bill is signed into law, 
time will tell if this freedom results in more overall success for FPCs.
Both FPCs and Benefit Corporations require an annual report, just as any 
traditional corporation.233 However, because hybrids must have a social purpose, 
unlike traditional corporations, information regarding that social purpose must be 
included in their reports.234 Benefit Corporations must report how they sought to 
produce a public benefit, and then what benefit, if any, resulted.235 Likewise, 
FPCs would be required to disclose what actions were taken, and the outcome of 
those actions.236
Senate Bill 201 takes reporting requirements a step further.  As proposed, 
FPCs would also be compelled to discuss the special-purpose-related objectives in 
the annual report, along with any changes made from the previous year.237 They 
would also have to identify the ways in which they seek to provide a public impact 
in the future.238 This requirement is an important tool for keeping businesses 
accountable.
Since the special purpose of an FPC is secondary to profit-making, it is hard 
to refrain from being suspicious of whether the special purpose will be achieved to 
a valuable degree.  To tackle these suspicions, Senate Bill 201 would require the 
directors to specify objectives by which to measure the FPC’s impact as it relates 
to the special purpose.239 Nevertheless, with the directors being given the 
privilege of selecting the impact standard, it seems that FPCs would be capable of 
getting away with doing very little.
While the impact of some FPCs may be noticeable in a community, the 
social benefit of others may be virtually insignificant.  How can it be ensured that 
an FPC’s standard of measuring social impact is not negligible?  Benefit 
Corporations are subject to an evaluation by a third-party standard in determining 
their social impact.240  FPCs do not have this requirement, and all evaluation of the 
performance of the special purpose is done by the standard that the corporation sets 
                                                          
230 See R. Todd Johnson, The Benefit Corporation: A Step In the Right Direction, But . . . ,
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for itself.241  FPCs are required to include their standard of evaluation in the annual 
report, but are not required to receive any input on the selection of that standard 
from a third party.242 Obtaining an outsider’s point of view on whether a 
corporation is, in fact, benefiting those who are “outsiders” of the corporation 
seems rational and essential.243
A follow-up to the issue of social impact is the means in which the social 
impact will be enforced.  The social mission is to be included in the FPC’s articles 
of incorporation, thus a component of the corporation’s day-to-day business.244  
For the traditional corporation, because the primary component is profit 
maximization, shareholders are given standing to sue directors when they act 
outside of the shareholders’ best interests.245 Since FPCs have the added 
component of a social impact, the question remains whether stakeholders should 
have standing to sue?
As introduced, Senate Bill 201 does not allow stakeholders to bring a claim 
if directors do not follow through with the social mission.246 Only shareholders 
and creditors may bring such a claim.247 Excluding creditors from ever bringing 
this type of claim, the only way for a director to be personally liable for failing to 
pursue the special purpose is for the shareholders to take action.248 Since 
shareholders are generally interested in maximizing their profits above all else, 
Bisconti’s fear may carry over from typical constituency statutes to the FPC.249  
Without the ability of stakeholders to bring a legal claim for disregarding the 
special purpose, directors can avoid the heat.  However, the special purpose of an 
FPC is at the heart of the organization.  Shareholders will know that when 
choosing to invest.250 It seems likely that if the bill passes, many investors in an 
FPC will do so because of their own commitment to the special purpose.  This 
would create a check on the directors, given the probability that a shareholder may 
just bring a claim regarding the directors’ ignorance of the special purpose.
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V. IMPACT
A.  The Future for California
Governor Schwarzenegger was the hurdle that hindered California’s last 
attempt at a constituency statute.  He will not have the opportunity to veto the 
current bill, as there is new governor in office.251 The state will have to rely on 
Governor Jerry Brown, a Democrat, to have a high regard for the possibility of a 
hybrid entity in California.  Susan MacCormac, who was a member of the 
Working Group that initially pushed the bill into existence, says the possibility of 
the bill passing is “looking good.”252 She does realize, however, that it is not a 
sure thing.253
B.  Will Other States Follow?
Many states have been receptive to the idea of hybrid organizations; some 
have already passed legislation and others have bills in consideration.254  For those 
states that are reluctant, the FPC may appeal as a happy medium.  FPCs have much 
more similarity to traditional corporations than other hybrids presented.  They 
would provide much incentive to corporations with little required from the state 
itself.  In general, corporate directors would be shielded from personal liability for 
making decisions that consider interests other than shareholder maximization, 
resulting in no burden to the state.
C.  Tax Breaks in the Future?
Tax treatment is a major concern for business and nonprofit entities.  One 
can only wonder whether the FPC, and other hybrids, would receive favorable tax 
treatment in the future.  It seems unlikely that FPC will receive any tax breaks.  
The L3C and Benefit Corporation, which are already in existence, do not yet enjoy 
tax advantages.255 These two business entities are skewed to the side of public 
benefit rather than profit-making, where the FPC fits.  Being that the FPC is 
essentially a for-profit corporation, it is highly unlikely that the entity will receive 
any favorable tax treatment.
D.  Dwindling Nonprofit Sector?
With the freshness of hybrid organizations, even in their constant growth it is 
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difficult to tell whether they will survive the test of time.  If they endure, it appears 
likely that the nonprofit sector, and perhaps the traditional for-profit sector, will 
shrink.  This effect occurred with the creation of another hybrid—the LLC.256  
Corporations, which were the major business entity only decades ago, have now 
been surpassed by LLCs in the creation of new ventures.257 It seems probable that 
nonprofit organizations will experience the same downfall, because hybrid 
organizations draw from the best assets of its predecessors just as LLCs did.
Although this may occur overall, the FPC will likely not have much of an 
effect on the fading nonprofit sector.  FPCs are skewed much farther to the wing of 
traditional corporations rather than nonprofit entities.  Unlike Benefit Corporations 
and L3Cs, FPCs are not required to primarily pursue a public benefit.  FPCs are
more closely aligned with socially responsible corporations, but have the incentive 
of avoiding director liability for considering impacts identified in their articles 
other than finances.
E.  New Liability Component for Breach of Social Duty?
Hybrid entities to date excuse directors from a duty to ensure that their social 
component is satisfied.  Although Benefit Corporations require directors to pursue 
a general public benefit, the legislation specifically states that directors cannot be 
held liable if the business fails to achieve its social goal.258 It also expressly states 
that directors “[do] not have any duty to a person that is a beneficiary of the public 
benefit purposes.”259 One can only wonder as the hybrids continue to grow, 
whether their social benefits will grow likewise.  If not, then perhaps legislators 
will have to take another look at directors’ duties.  
VI. CONCLUSION
At the rate new hybrid entities are springing up, at some point the number of 
corporate entities may become overwhelming.  However, California has taken 
action at the top end of the hybrid emergence.  Before California’s introduction of 
the FPC, L3Cs and Benefit Corporations were the only separate hybrid entities 
recognized by U.S. law, and the FPC is substantially different from both.  The 
distinctions between the three entities are great enough to merit independent 
recognition.  In the words of John Fogerty, the states “better get while the getting’s
good,”260 and that is just what California has done.
                                                          
256 Chrisman, supra note 49, at 460; Kleinberger, supra note 27, at 886.
257 Chrisman, supra note 49, at 460; Kleinberger, supra note 27, at 886.
258 MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07(c) (West 2011).
259 Id. at § 5-6C-07(b).
260 JOHN FOGERTY, UP AROUND THE BEND (Fantasy Records 1970).
